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Hendricks and Spina: SB 221: The Creation of Election Leadership Committees

ELECTIONS
Ethics in Government: Amend Chapter 5 of Title 21 of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to Ethics in Government, so
as to Provide for a Definition; Provide for Leadership Committees;
Provide for Chairpersons; Provide that Such Committees May
Receive Contributions and Make Expenditures; Provide for
Disposition of Assets in Certain Circumstances; Provide for Filings
and Reports; Provide an Exception from Contribution Limits;
Provide for Certain Notices; Provide for Related Matters; Repeal
Conflicting Laws; and for Other Purposes
CODE SECTIONS:
BILL NUMBER:
ACT NUMBER:
GEORGIA LAWS:
SUMMARY:

O.C.G.A. § 21-5-34.2
SB 221
219
2021 Ga. Laws 219
The Act primarily provides for the
creation of leadership committees that
accept
contributions
and
make
expenditures for the purpose of
affecting the outcome of elections or
advocating for the election or defeat of
candidates. The governor, lieutenant
governor, or a political party’s nominee
for those positions, and the Democratic
and Republican leaders in the state
Senate and House would control and
chair such committees: specifically, one
person designated by the majority
caucus of the House of Representatives,
one by the minority caucus of the House
of Representatives, one by the majority
caucus of the Senate, and one by the
minority caucus of the Senate. Notably,
these leadership committees will be able
to raise funds and receive donations
during legislative sessions—an ability

155

Published by Reading Room, 2022

1

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 17

156

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

EFFECTIVE DATE:

[Vol. 38:1

previously reserved to the Assembly’s
political parties.
July 1, 2021

“‘Transparency’ is the word of the decade. . . . Everything is
transparent, and if it isn’t, it should be.”
Senator Jeff Mullis (R-53rd), Georgia Senate Floor Session,
February 26, 2021
History
Political Action Committees (PACs) and independent groups exist
and operate within the Georgia political arena and can receive
unlimited funds from interested donors.1 Laws, however, limit the
amount of funds that PACs can contribute to an individual candidate.2
Additionally, PACs cannot (and were never meant to) contribute to
individual members of the Georgia General Assembly during the
legislative session.3
In contrast to PACs, leadership committees established under
Senate Bill (SB) 221, nicknamed the “Political Expenditure
Transparency Act” by Senator Jeff Mullis (R-53rd), have no
fundraising and contribution restrictions.4 SB 221 does, however,
mandate these fundraising committees to comply with several
reporting and disclosure requirements, which aim to free the Georgia
democratic process from the “outside influence of . . . dark money.”5
1. See
Campaign
Finance
Requirements
in
Georgia,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Campaign_finance_requirements_in_Georgia [https://perma.cc/R2WU-TFN7];
Jonathan Raymond, What Does Georgia’s New Campaign Finance Law Do?, 11 ALIVE,
https://www.11alive.com/article/news/politics/what-does-georgias-new-campaign-finance-law-do/85ca1c49fb-f940-415a-a939-60e1f1d6ef54 [https://perma.cc/BN7X-87QR] (May 29, 2021, 11:29 AM); see
also 52 U.S.C. § 30101(4)-(6); Understanding Nonconnected PACs, FEC, https://www.fec.gov/helpcandidates-and-committees/registering-pac/understanding-nonconnected-pacs/ [https://perma.cc/5VU9HK72].
2. O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41 (2021).
3. Id. § 21-5-35.
4. See id. § 21-5-34.2(e) (“The contribution limits in Code [s]ection 21-5-41 shall not apply to
contributions to a leadership committee or expenditures made by a leadership committee in support of a
candidate or a group of named candidates.”).
5. Id. § 21-5-34.2(d); Video Recording of Senate Proceedings at 3 hr., 42 min., 11 sec. (Feb. 26,
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Just as with PACs and candidate committees, SB 221 requires the
leadership committees to register with the Georgia Government
Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission and report their
financial activity on periodic public disclosure reports.6
The contention and debate around the Act come from the exception
given to the leadership committees, which is the ability of caucus
leadership to manage funds directly rather than using the larger
political party as an intermediary. From its opponents, the bill received
the alternative nickname, “the Gold Dome swamp bill,” which refers
to the ethical concerns related to allowing unlimited funds to be given
during session.7 On the other hand, proponents emphasize that the bill
guarantees the mandatory disclosure of all money from PACs and
influential outside money.8 But Senator Jennifer Jordan (D-6th)
expressed concern that SB 221’s provisions on financial disclosures
would create anything but “transparency,” explaining:
All the leadership committee has to disclose is that they got $100
million from [a PAC fund]. They don’t have to talk about how it
came from China, came from Kelly Loeffler, came from big
tobacco, came from payday lenders. None of that. So, the whole idea
that this stops “dark money,” and this is transparent . . . is not true.
And in fact, what it’s going to do is it’s going to make dark money
more prevalent.9

2021) [hereinafter Senate Proceedings Video] (remarks by Sen. Jeff Mullis (R-53rd)),
https://livestream.com/accounts/26021522/events/7940809/videos/218060808.
6. See § 21-5-34.2(e) (requiring leadership committees that receive contributions or contributes more
than $500 to register with the commission and requiring disclosure reports).
7. Susanna Capelouto, Georgia Lawmakers Find Way for Unlimited Fundraising While in Session,
WABE (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.wabe.org/georgia-lawmakers-find-way-for-unlimited-fundraisingwhile-in-session/ [https://perma.cc/WV3D-3XHR]; see also Video Interview with Rep. Matthew Wilson
(D-80th) (May 21, 2021) (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review).
8. Senate Proceedings Video, supra note 5, at 3 hr., 43 min., 05 sec. (remarks by Sen. Jeff Mullis
(R-53rd)).
9. Senate Proceedings Video, supra note 5, at 3 hr., 51 min., 36 sec. (remarks by Sen. Jennifer Jordan
(D-6th)).
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Bill Tracking of SB 221
Consideration and Passage by the Senate
Senator Jeff Mullis (R-53rd) sponsored SB 221 in the Senate with
Senator Butch Miller (R-49th), Senator Mike Dugan (R-30th), Senator
Steve Gooch (R-51st), Senator John Kennedy (R-18th), Senator Larry
Walker, III (R-20th), Senator Dean Burke (R-11th), and Senator Bill
Cowsert (R-46th) cosponsoring.10 The bill was prefiled on February
22, 2021, and the Senate first read the bill on February 23, 2021.11 The
Senate referred the bill to the Senate Rules Committee that same day.12
The following day, the Senate Rules Committee favorably reported the
bill as originally written.13
The Senate read the bill for a second time on February 25, 2021, and
a third time on February 26, 2021.14 Senator Brandon Beach (R-21st)
introduced a floor amendment to the bill; it aimed to add the following
language to line 20 as introduced on the Senate floor: “[L]eadership
committees can only spend funds on general election races or on
incumbents in a primary election.”15 The amendment failed, but the
Senate adopted the bill by a vote of 30 to 21.16
Consideration and Passage by the House
Representative Trey Kelley (R-16th) sponsored SB 221 in the
House.17 The House first read the bill on March 1, 2021, and a second
time on March 3, 2021.18 The House referred the bill to the House
Judiciary Committee, which favorably reported on the bill on March
10. Georgia General Assembly, SB 221, Bill Tracking [hereinafter SB 221, Bill Tracking],
https://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/59920.
11. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 221, May 13, 2021; SB 221, Bill Tracking,
supra note 10.
12. SB 221, Bill Tracking, supra note 10.
13. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 221, May 13, 2021.
14. Id.
15. Failed Senate Floor Amendment to SB 221, introduced by Sen. Brandon Beach (R-21st), Feb. 26,
2021.
16. Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 221, #89, #90 (Feb. 26, 2021).
17. SB 221, Bill Tracking, supra note 10.
18. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 221, May 13, 2021.
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16, 2021.19 On March 18, 2021, the House read SB 221 for the third
time.20 The House then voted to pass the bill as introduced by a vote
of 96 to 69.21
The bill was sent to Governor Brian Kemp (R) on April 7, 2021.22
The Governor signed the bill into law on May 4, 2021, and the Act
became effective on July 1, 2021.23
The Act
The Act amends Title 21 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated,
which regulates state elections, by adding Code section 21-5-34.2.24
This section establishes and provides for the function of leadership
committees not restrained by maximum contribution limits but subject
those committees to mandatory financial reporting requirements for all
donations they receive.25
Subsection (a) outlines two different types of the leadership
committees governed under this section.26 First, the Governor, the
Lieutenant Governor, or a political party’s nominee for either
Governor or Lieutenant Governor during the year that they are
nominated would chair a leadership committee.27 Second, the majority
and minority caucuses of both the Georgia House of Representatives
and the Georgia Senate may designate up to two PACs as leadership
committees.28 The subsection, however, explicitly states that no one
may serve as chairperson on more than one leadership committee.29
Subsection (b) provides for the leadership committees’ fundraising
function.30 The Act permits leadership committees to receive
donations and contributions from any persons that support the cause or
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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Id.
Id.
Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, SB 221, #270 (Mar. 18, 2021).
State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 221, May 13, 2021.
Id.
2021 Ga. Laws 219, § 1, at 467–68 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 21-5-34.2 (2021)).
O.C.G.A. § 21-5-34.2 (2021).
Id. § 21-5-34.2(a).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 21-5-34.2(b).
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purpose of the specific leadership committee.31 This subsection, as
well as the remainder of the bill, provides zero restrictions as to the
source of donations to leadership committees.32
Subsection (c) outlines the procedure for when committee
chairpersons no longer hold elected office.33 When a chairperson
leaves office, that person’s leadership committee must (1) “transfer [all
the committee’s] assets . . . to another leadership committee” within a
sixty-day period, (2) name another person who complies with the
requirements of subsection (a) as chairperson of the leadership
committee within sixty days, or (3) dispose entirely of the leadership
committee’s assets in compliance with Code section 21-5-33.34
Subsection (d) provides for the purpose and utility of the funds
raised by leadership committees.35 All funds obtained by leadership
committees can “affect[] the outcome of any election,” whether in
support of a party candidate or advocating for the defeat of another.36
Funds may also counterbalance or defray all expenses incurred by
campaigns for a candidate’s reelection or the retention of their office.37
Subsection (e) attempts to achieve Senator Jeff Mullis’s (R-53rd)
goal of financial transparency by aiding the effort to expose “dark
money” within Georgia state politics. Notably, a leadership committee
must register and report all contributions exceeding $500 to the
Georgia Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission within ten
days of receiving the contribution.38 Also, all communications funded
and paid for by the leadership committee to achieve the purposes
outlined under subsection (d) must contain either an audible or written
disclaimer unless otherwise impractical.39 This subsection, however,
excludes leadership committees from all contribution limitations as
outlined under the relevant Code section.40

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

§ 21-5-34.2(b).
Id.
Id. § 21-5-34.2(c).
Id.
Id. § 21-5-34.2(d).
Id.
§ 21-5-34.2(d).
Id. §§ 21-5-3(5), -34.2(e).
Id. § 21-5-34.2(e).
Id.
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Lastly, subsection (f) clarifies that leadership committees are
completely “separate legal entities from [a] candidate’s campaign
committee” and should not be considered or categorized as an
independent committee.41
Analysis
Although Senator Jeff Mullis (R-53rd) contends that this
“non-partisan bill equally benefits the electoral fundraising efforts of
both the Democrats and the Republicans,” SB 221’s opponents assert
otherwise .42 Specifically, opponents warn that the bill will “tip the
scale” in favor of those already holding power within Georgia
politics.43 Senator Jennifer Jordan (D-6th) argues that the bill’s
disclosure requirement will amplify, rather than combat, the influence
of “dark money” in Georgia politics.44 According to Senator Jordan,
by eliminating contribution limitations and permitting unlimited
donations to leadership committees during the General Assembly
session, the bill will “benefit[] [those] who have decided to take
themselves out of having to follow the rules.”45 Although Georgia may
have to wait until the next election cycle to observe the full financial
and ethical results of SB 221, some immediate impacts can be
anticipated.
Transparency
During the House floor debate on this bill, House Majority Whip
Representative Trey Kelley (R-16th) said that “[SB 221] is full of
transparency and sunshine.” 46 Representative Kelley noted two
41. Id. § 21-5-34.2(f).
42. Senate Proceedings Video, supra note 5, at 3 hr., 43 min., 55 sec. (remarks by Sen. Jeff Mullis
(R-53rd)); Id. at 3 hr., 51 min., 36 sec. (remarks by Sen. Jennifer Jordan (D-6th)).
43. James Salzer, Kemp the First to Set up Newly Legal Unlimited Donation Committee, ATLANTA J.CONST. (Aug. 1, 2021), https://www.ajc.com/politics/kemp-the-first-to-set-up-newly-legal-unlimiteddonation-committee/X36LZUQJFFE3NBE4PPY2GQYXDU/ [https://perma.cc/CB6L-872N].
44. Senate Proceedings Video, supra note 5, at 3 hr., 51 min., 36 sec. (remarks by Sen. Jennifer Jordan
(D-6th)).
45. Salzer, supra note 43.
46. Video Recording of House Proceedings at 1 hr., 3 min., 30 sec. (Mar. 18, 2021) [hereinafter House
Proceedings
Video]
(remarks
by
Rep.
Trey
Kelley
(R-16th)),
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required functions of leadership committees that shine light on their
transparency: (1) once a leadership committee raises $500, then the
same fundraising disclosure rules of individual candidates will govern
the leadership committee and (2) when the leadership committee
expends funds, the expenditure comes with a disclaimer that the named
leadership committee spent the funds.47
SB 221 may slightly increase transparency if an individual or entity
that was otherwise giving directly to a party’s trust fund, as an
intermediary, and the trust then passes their donations to a leadership
committee.48 Yet, the existence of leadership committees and their new
ability to coordinate directly with candidates do not automatically
dissolve the shadow of “dark money” over Georgia politics that
concerns watchdog groups like OpenSecrets.org.49
Although SB 221 does not “decrease” the amount of transparency
in the election cycle, nothing stops like-minded donors from giving
money first to a non-profit or existing PAC and then having that PAC
give the money to a leadership committee, which effectively conceals
the identity of the original donors. For example, an individual wishing
to support a politician while also remaining anonymous could first
donate to the politician’s affiliated PAC, which could, in turn, give
money to the corresponding leadership committee coordinating with
the politician’s campaign, and the disclosure would only show the
donation from the affiliated PAC.50 Although any amount of
“sunshine” is good for Georgia, SB 221 fails to fully open the curtains
on the original sources of funds for many campaigns.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o0OECqHulew.
47. Id. Here, Representative Kelley is referring to the requirements in Code section 21-5-34(a)(2)(A),
(b), and (c). See O.C.G.A. § 21-5-34(a)(2)(A)–(c) (2020).
48. For example, an individual contributing $501 directly to the Republican Party Trust would not
need to be disclosed when the trust, in turn, passes the money to a candidate; however, the leadership
committee would need to disclose donors in respect to Code section 21-5-34. See § 21-5-34.
49. Isaiah Poritz, A Little Known Georgia Campaign Finance Law Will Allow Select Candidates to
Collect Unlimited Campaign Cash, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Aug. 19, 2021, 11:44 AM),
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2021/08/georgia-campaign-finance-law-allow-candidates-collectunlimited-cash/ [https://perma.cc/Z2P7-G47Y].
50. See O.C.G.A. § 21-5-34.2 (2021).
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Advantages to Incumbents
With incumbents already possessing a general electoral advantage
over their challengers, critics of SB 221 believe the bill builds a bridge
that goes too far, calling it the “Incumbent Protection Act.”51 Although
SB 221 does not entirely tip the scales in favor of incumbents, it does
give incumbents a head start on campaigning via its leadership
committees.
First, SB 221’s passage may have an impact on primary challengers.
Now that incumbent candidates may raise funds during the session,
primary challengers lose the advantage of getting a head start on their
incumbent opponents. Although a leadership committee could
withhold funds from the incumbent (or even fund the opposition
challenger), that mechanism already existed through PACs before SB
221.52
In addition to removing an existing advantage for primary
challengers, SB 221 gives earlier access to incumbents facing
challengers from across the aisle, particularly in the race for the
governor’s mansion. For example, Governor Brian Kemp (R) is the
first to make use of the leadership committees.53 Because SB 221
allows for leadership committees for the “Governor” and “the nominee
of a political party for Governor selected in a primary election in the
year in which he or she is nominated,” incumbent Governors can start
raising funds through a leadership committee even if they have a
primary challenger, whereas opposition candidates must wait until the
conclusion of the primary election before they can raise funds through
the same mechanism.54

51. Rickey Bevington, ‘It’s Essentially an Incumbent Protection Act’: New Law to Allow Unlimited
Fundraising—for a Few, GA. PUB. BROAD., https://www.gpb.org/news/2021/05/13/its-essentiallyincumbent-protection-act-new-law-allow-unlimited-fundraising-for
[https://perma.cc/4BT3-CFEH]
(May 17, 2021, 11:43 AM).
52. See Campaign Reports–Other than Candidate Committees, GA. GOV’T TRANSPARENCY &
CAMPAIGN
FIN.
COMM’N,
https://media.ethics.ga.gov/Search/Campaign/Campaign_Namesearchresults_NC.aspx?CommitteeType
=1&CommitteeName= [https://perma.cc/23RA-TEN7].
53. Salzer, supra note 43.
54. See id.; § 21-5-34.2(a).
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Another possible issue is the limitation of these leadership
committees to political parties and a minority caucus.55 Many political
groups, such as the Libertarian Party of Georgia, are not formally
registered as political parties and do not hold primaries in the same
way as the Republican and Democratic parties of Georgia.56 If groups
such as the Libertarian Party of Georgia, the Green Party of Georgia,
or any groups of like-minded independent candidates take seats in the
Assembly, then those groups would be constrained by the existing
ethics rules and would have to rely on the goodwill of the leadership
committees for fundraising during session.
Total Amount of Money Raised for Campaigns
Limits restrain how much statewide candidates may receive from
individual donors.57 Additionally, the Campaign Finance Commission
sets these limits that vary between statewide and other offices.58 For
example, gubernatorial candidates can receive a total of $14,000 from
individual donors, assuming no run-offs.59 With the price tag of the
2018 election being upwards of $100 million, it makes sense that
candidates would want access to an entity that can receive unlimited
funds from those donors and then distribute them on the donors’
behalf.60
Both a donor’s ability to give unlimited funds to the leadership
committees and the leadership committees’ ability to use those funds
during session alarm opponents of the bill. Representative Matthew
Wilson (D-80th) stated that “the only purpose that this bill serves is to
funnel more money into our politics.”61 Although observers must wait
55. See § 21-5-34.2.
56. Telephone Interview with Ryan Graham, Chair, Libertarian Party of Ga. (July 15, 2021) (on file
with the Georgia State University Law Review).
57. O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41(a)-(b) (2021).
58. See Contribution Limits, GA. GOV’T TRANSPARENCY & CAMPAIGN FIN. COMM.,
https://ethics.ga.gov/contribution-limits/ [https://perma.cc/W9NC-YSBT].
59. Id.
60. James Salzer & Greg Bluestein, Final Price Tag on Georgia Governor’s Race Exceeds $100
Million, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—
politics/final-price-tag-georgia-governor-race-exceeds-100-million/R0brqTrDaxwkAXq4mLMHuK/
[https://perma.cc/533D-QSZ5].
61. House Proceedings Video, supra note 46, at 1 hr., 15 min., 1 sec. (remarks by Rep. Matthew
Wilson (D-80th)).
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until next election cycle to see if an increase in total campaign
donations results from SB 221’s passage, PACs supporting the 2022
reelection of Governor Kemp have already begun migrating existing
funds to his leadership committee.62
As for the effect on Assembly members, Representative Stacey
Evans (D-57th) expressed concern over handing the expense control
to the caucus leadership, noting that it may curtail any hope of an
“independent streak” for a General Assembly member who disagrees
with their party.63 If the PACs that support General Assembly
members follow the direction of those supporting Governor Kemp,
rather than looking to PACs for the mainstay of their funds, some
(particularly junior) General Assembly members may instead look to
their respective leadership committee to back their candidacy.64
Representative Kelley responded to these concerns by noting that
establishing a leadership committee is entirely optional and that “no
one is being forced to do this.”65 As of September 2021, neither the
Senate nor the House caucus has set up a leadership committee—the
only existing one is for Governor Kemp.66
Conclusion
Time will demonstrate the bill’s true functionality—whether that be
to resolve concerns relating to the influence of “dark money” in
Georgia politics or to financially influence legislators to vote in
accordance with the needs of special interest groups during the session.
Since these leadership committees must comply with the reporting
requirements, the donors that make use of this new mechanism must
be amicable to “transparency and sunshine.”67 Whether transparency
62. Salzer, supra note 43 (“Kemp-backers have already had a political nonprofit called Keeping
Georgia Strong that can take unlimited funds from donors, including—at least $45,000 from health care
giant HCA, $15,000 from the nursing home lobby and $10,000 from the filmmakers PAC. But the
nonprofit’s CEO, Capitol lobbyist Clay Huckaby, said it is being phased out now that the leadership
committee has been created.”).
63. House Proceedings Video, supra note 46, at 1 hr., 10 min., 4 sec. (remarks by Rep. Stacey Evans
(D-57th)).
64. See id.
65. Id. at 1 hr., 20 min., 9 sec. (remarks by Rep. Trey Kelley (R-16th)).
66. Salzer, supra note 43.
67. See O.C.G.A. § 21-5-34(a)(1)(B), (b)(1)(A)-(G) (2020); House Proceedings Video, supra note 46,
at 1 hr., 3 min., 30 sec.
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deters donors or whether the lack of contribution caps will entice
donors are two points that deserve close observation come next
election cycle.
Nolan Hendricks & Paul Joseph Spina
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